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HAZARDS OF HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS
— by Neil E. Harl*
In the same manner as others bearing price risks,
farmers buy and sell commodity futures to hedge against
fluctuating prices.1 Likewise, farm taxpayers sometimes
engage in speculative transactions.
A principal matter of concern from an income tax
perspective is the line between hedging and speculation.
Hedging transactions are defined in terms of reducing the
risk of price (or interest rate) fluctuations in the ordinary
course of the taxpayer’s business.2 Both sets of issues are
discussed in this article.
What are “hedge-to-arrive” contracts?
Hedge-to-arrive or HTA contracts emerged about a
decade ago in the Eastern Cornbelt and have since spread
unevenly over much of the grain-producing regions of the
country. The contracts operate in a manner similar to a
hedge except — (1) the buyer (often the local elevator) has
usually borne the margin deposits rather than the seller (as
under a hedge) and (2) the seller can benefit from a
narrowing of the basis in the commodity. Although the
buyer shoulders the margin calls, those costs are ultimately
passed to the seller. In recent months, the mounting margin
calls and the costs incurred in rolling the contracts to a later
futures month have risen to such a level as to raise a
question whether the seller has sufficient assets to pay the
obligation. In some instances, lenders supplying credit to
elevators and other buyers obligated under HTA contracts
have been requesting additional collateral to back lines of
credit to the buyers. Losses of as much as a half million
dollars on HTA contracts have been charged back to sellers.
HTA contracts were conceived and flourished in times
of relative stability in commodity prices. Few anticipated
the extreme price patterns seen during the first four months
of 1996.
Regulatory framework governing hedge-to-arrive
contracts
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
has been given statutory authority over “accounts,
agreements ... and transactions involving contracts of sale of
a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a
contract market....”3 Federal law specifies that these
“futures” contracts are illegal “off-exchange” contracts
unless offered and sold on CFTC-designated boards of
trade.4 Bona fide hedging transactions are specifically
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exempted from the legislation.5
Cash forward contracts are excluded from the definition
of futures contracts and thus are not subject to CFTC
regulation.6 These are “any sale of any cash commodity for
deferred shipment or delivery.”7 The exclusion for cash
forward contracts is predicated upon the fact that both
parties to the contract contemplate future delivery of the
actual commodity and intend that delivery of the actual
commodity occur.8 The exclusion is not available to cover
contracts of sale for commodities sold for speculative
purposes and which are not based upon the expectation that
delivery of the actual commodity by the seller would occur
in the future.9
Origin of cash forward contract rule. The exclusion for
cash forward contracts originated in the Futures Trading
Act of 1921.10 Excessive speculation and price manipulation
had been occurring on the grain futures markets.11 In an
attempt to limit the observed abuses in the futures markets,
Congress imposed a tax at prohibitive levels (20 cents per
bushel) on all futures contracts with two exceptions.12
Under one exception, the 1921 legislation exempted from
the tax future delivery contracts entered into by owners and
growers of grain, owners and renters of land on which the
grain was produced and associations comprised of such
persons.13 The legislation also exempted from the tax future
delivery contracts made through (or by) members which
had been designated as contract markets.14 As a result of
objections raised on behalf of farmers and grain elevators,
the Senate added language to the pending legislation
excluding “any sale of cash grain for deferred shipment”
from the term “future delivery.”15 In the hearings, it was
made clear that the additional language on cash forward
contracts was premised on the fact that both parties to the
contracts deal in and contemplate future delivery of the
actual grain.16 The Futures Trading Act of 1921 was
declared unconstitutional in 1922 as an impermissible
attempt to regulate using the taxing power.17 The Congress
then enacted the Grain Futures Act of 1922 which regulated
grain futures trading under the Commerce Clause of the US
Constitution.18 The cash forward contract exclusion was
included in the 1922 legislation.19 The exclusion was
reworded in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 to
except “any cash commodity for deferred shipment or
delivery.”20 The 1936 legislation also deleted the express
exemption for owner and growers of grain, owners and
renters of land and associations of such persons. That move
was justified on the grounds that the legislation excluded
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cash commodity contracts for deferred shipment or
delivery; the specific exemption was, therefore, not
needed.21
The language excluding cash commodities for deferred
shipment or delivery has been continued to the present. The
1974 amendments to the legislation reaffirmed that, in a
cash forward contract, the parties contemplate transfer of
the actual commodity.22 As the courts have noted, nothing
in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended for
the exclusion to embrace agreements for the future delivery
of commodities sold for purposes of speculation.23
The CFTC has issued several interpretative releases in
recent years on the scope of cash forward contracts and the
delivery requirement.
• In 1985, the CFTC tried to distinguish cash forward
contracts from option contracts.24 The CFTC referred to a
forward contract as “a binding agreement on both parties to
the contract; one must agree to make delivery and the other
to take delivery of the commodity.”25 The Commission also
stated that the parties to the contracts must be “commercial
entities that have the capacity to make or take delivery” and
that delivery routinely occurs.26
• In 1987, the Commission again addressed cash forward
contracts —
“Although such transactions may be settled other than by
delivery on more than an occasional basis, it appears that
departure from the traditional requirement of settlement by
delivery of the physical commodity occurs on the basis of
privately negotiated agreements by principals who have the
capacity to make or take delivery, who contemplate actual
delivery or acceptance of delivery in some of those
transactions, but who may be unable to determine at the
inception of the transaction that delivery will not be
required.”27
• In 1990, CFTC took a somewhat more relaxed view of
the delivery obligation by noting that in specific cases “...
the transactions may ultimately result in performance
through the payment of cash as an alternative to actual
physical delivery or delivery of the commodity.”28 The
Commission went on to state —
“...while such agreements may extinguish a party’s delivery
obligation, they are separate, individually negotiated, new
agreements, there is no obligation or arrangement to enter
into such agreements, they are not provided for by the
terms of the contracts as initially entered into, and any
party that is in a position in a distribution chain that
provides for the opportunity to book-out with another party
or parties in the chain is nevertheless entitled to require
delivery of the commodity to be made through it, as
required under the contracts.”29
Further guidance may be forthcoming from CFTC on
the regulatory status of “cash forward contracts.”
Applicability to hedge-to-arrive contracts. An important
question is whether the so-called “hedge-to-arrive”
contracts are considered to be cash forward contracts and,
therefore, within the statutory exception. For such contracts
extending two to three years into the future, with rollovers
permitted to later contract months, and with no expectation
of delivery, it would seem that such contracts might not
come within the exception. That outcome seems indeed
likely if the seller does not have sufficient commodity on
hand or expected to be produced to cover the amount
specified in the contract. Thus, it would appear that at least
some of the contracts may be “off-exchange” contracts
which, as noted above30 may be illegal. A contract involving
an off-exchange futures contract or trade option runs the
risk of being held unenforceable by federal and state courts.
A careful review of contracts with legal cousel and those
knowledgeable about risk management strategies is
suggested.     Contracts with the potential for deepening losses
   need immediate attention   .
Income tax treatment
Hedges produce ordinary gains and ordinary losses and
are not subject to the loss deferral rules and the “mark-to-
market” provisions that are applicable to speculative
transactions.31 Indeed, gains and losses from hedge
transactions are treated like gains and losses from
transactions involving the actual commodities. Losses from
hedge transactions can be used to offset ordinary income
from grain sales and from sales of livestock held for sale in
the ordinary course of business.
Speculative transactions are treated differently.
Gains from speculative transactions are treated as capital
gains; losses are reported as capital losses. In general,
positions in regulated futures contracts are subject to the
“mark-to-market” rules and are treated as if sold on the last
day of the year.32 Gains or losses arising under those
calculations are treated as if they were 60 percent long-term
and 40 percent short-term without regard to the actual
holding period. Hedging transactions are exempt from these
rules.33
Long-term capital losses can be used to offset long-term
capital gains and, for individuals, up to $3,000 of ordinary
income each year.34 Excess capital losses can be carried
forward indefinitely for individuals35 and for up to five
years for corporate taxpayers.36 Losses from regulated
futures contracts can be carried back by individuals to the
three prior years.37 The maximum loss that may be carried
back to any carryback year is the regulated futures gain in
that year (without regard to regulated futures losses) that is
the lesser of the net capital gain for the year, taking into
account only gains and losses from regulated futures
contracts or the net capital gain income for the tax year.38
Requirements for a hedge
To be considered a hedge, the futures transaction must
have the effect of reducing price (or interest rate) risk.
Courts have emphasized two tests in evaluating commodity
futures transactions as hedges or speculative venture.
Insurance test. If futures trading is used to offset price
changes in actual commodities (the “actuals”), the
transactions should be viewed as hedges.39 That means
gains on the actual commodities should be offset by losses
on the futures trade. Similarly, losses on the actual
commodities should be offset by gains on the futures
transactions.
Typically, someone purchasing a commodity would sell
a contract on the futures market in order to avoid price risk.
When the commodity is sold, the futures contract is
repurchased. Gains on one offset losses on the other. Thus,
hedges usually involve ownership of actual commodities.
Direct relation test. Under the direct relations test, there
must be a reasonable relationship between the amount of
actuals involved and the amount of the trading in the futures
market.40 In cases where the volume of futures trading
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greatly exceeded the amount of actuals, the transactions
have been held to be speculative in nature.41
Recently issued regulations
Final regulations were issued in late 1994 providing
guidance on reporting hedging and speculative transactions
involving futures.42 Taxpayers other than farmers and other
small businesses are required to take gains and losses from
hedges into account in the same period as the income,
deductions and gains or losses on the item hedged.43
However, for farm and small business taxpayers on the cash
method of accounting, the simpler methods used previously
and allowing the reporting of gains and losses on a cash
accounting basis can continue to govern the reporting of
hedge transactions if the taxpayer has no more than
$5,000,000 of gross receipts.44
Taxpayers are required to identify hedges when entered
into, along with the item or items hedged.45
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
CATTLE. The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff’s
car struck a steer owned by the defendant on a public
highway. The steer had wandered 1400 feet to the highway
through an open gate. The defendant had testified that the
gate was closed when the defendant last used it the day
before the accident. The plaintiff provided no evidence of
any negligent act by the defendant which resulted in the gate
being left open. After noting that Fla. Stat. § 588.15
required a showing of intentional or negligent act by the
defendant before liability would attach for livestock running
at large on a public road, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff argued that the
statute, as interpreted by the trial court, placed too high a
burden on the plaintiff. The plaintiff also argued that the
“dog bite” statute subjected dog owners to a strict liability
standard; therefore, the plaintiff argued that Section 588.15,
as interpreted by the trial court, violated the plaintiff’s equal
